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3 book in speeches and articles. Politically, its ideas are seen to present both a warning of how technological progress can impose great costs on society and an opportunity to identify the . The book is a key contribution in a broader contemporary debate focused on the implications of digital technologies for the future of work (see e.g. Mason, 2015) .
Despite its modern-day relevance and significance, there has been no real critical discussion (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014: 11) .
Beyond displacing many existing jobs, digital technologies are also set to increase inequality in society. Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014: 148-9) see the prospect of a -take-all-, wealth, and life chances of a small elite soars ahead of the rest of society. They highlight the rise in income inequality and fall in over recent decades as evidence of the regressive effects of technological change (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014: 132-34 to prevent mass unemployment. What is needed is the imagination and entrepreneurial flair to spot the employment opportunities that will emerge. As for the quality of jobs, Brynjolfsson and McAfee imply that jobs in the future will be superior to jobs in the present. Progress in digital technologies, they suggest, will mean
Good jobs in the future will include creative writer, digital scientist, and entrepreneur (see Brynjolfsson and MacAfee, 6 2015). While other less good jobs such as gardener and carer may persist (at least until digital technologies eliminate them), the economy will tend towards the creation of new and better quality jobs (ibid.). The latter outcome, in essence, will result from workers finding ways to complement digital technologies. T machines, instead of against them by Brynjolfsson and MacAfee as a route to economic and social progress.
The authors also recommend interventions designed to combat rising inequality (or stemming from digital technologies. As highlighted above, Brynjolfsson and McAfee view that new sources of paid employment and high quality paid employment at that can and will be created in the future suggests that inequality linked to unemployment can be kept at bay. More directly, they support investment in education and infrastructure together with the encouragement of greater immigration and entrepreneurship, to help support higher employment and in turn lower inequality (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014: 208-21) . They also consider the merits of other policies , (ibid.: 232-38), to aid those at the bottom of the income distribution.
Notably, the authors distance themselves from more radical reforms (see also McAfee, 2015) for example, they reject alternatives to capitalism, preferring instead to work within the confines of capitalist social relations (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014: 231) . Their general policy agenda, as they admit, is relatively modest, being concerned with the promotion of higher rates of overall economic growth (ibid.: 228).
Brynjolfsson and McAfee , in summary, highlights both the advantages and disadvantages of digital technologies for the work realm. Although their book offers no 7 decisive verdict on the outcomes of the Second Machine Age, it does suggest that society has the capa technologies. The book is a call for society and more directly, policy-makers to harness digital technologies in a way that secures a better future for work and humanity more generally.
Second thoughts on the Second Machine Age
The thesis There are two interrelated points to make here. The first relates to the objective of digital technologies. Insofar as these are developed under capitalism, they have as their primary objective the goal of increased surplus value production. Here the notion of surplus value refers to the additional value created by workers in production that is not remunerated by wages in effect, it represents the unpaid work time of workers and this time constitutes the source of capitalist profit (for a presentation and defence of the labour theory of value, see Elson, 1979; Foley, 2000; Fine, 2001) . The point here is that digital technologies are defined and limited by the quest for surplus value they are not unbounded. If digital technologies jeopardise surplus value production, then they will be blocked by capital. The second point relates to the consequences of digital technologies. To the extent that the latter are used for the purposes of surplus value production, they will lead to outcomes that 8 are favourable for capitalist employers and unfavourable for workers. Digital technologies can and often are used to facilitate exploitation and in this sense they represent no necessary friend of workers.
To illustrate the points made above, consider how digital technologies have actually been used. Take Within more conventional work settings, capitalist employers can use digital technologies to increase surplus value production. For example, they can get workers to wear electronic devices that measure and monitor, on a moment-by-moment basis, their health and wellbeing. These devices are often marketed as part of wellness programmes; however, their aim and effect is to increase the amount of work performed by workers. This increase about their work and lives, but rather because they are subject to increased surveillance and longer hours of work (often outside the workplace) ironically, the pursuit of wellness can lead to a more stressed and anxious workforce (Davies, 2015; Cederström and Spicer, 2015) . Within Amazon warehouses, to take one infamous case, digital technologies are used to measure and monitor performance T dehumanise the workplace (Schumpeter, 2015) . Capitalist employers, to give another example, can also now use sophisticated digital scheduling devices that fit workers to work in a more precise way, thereby reducing the porosity of the working day (Luce, 2015) . These examples illustrate how capitalist employers are able to shape the design and operation of digital technologies to realise their own goals, at the expense of those of workers.
The problem with Brynjolfsson and McAfee is that they see digital technologies in essentially apolitical term there is more in their book on the power of computers than on the power of capital and as such they fail to explain how these technologies are and will be used in ways that increase the exploitation of workers. The authors, to be sure, recognise issues of power they do so, specifically, when considering the . Here however, power is treated almost as an after-effect of digital technologies. What the authors fail to show is how power affects the selection and evolution of digital technologies on an ongoing basis that is, they fail to identify the essential political nature and content of digital technologies.
A second related point can be made here. This relates to the limits imposed by surplus value production on the replacement of labour by digital technologies. The need for capital to ensure that surplus value is produced creates a tendency for capital to use labour within production even where digital technologies may allow for its replacement. The realisation of surplus value as profit also provides a reason for capital to keep workers in paid work so as to maintain levels of effective demand. Huws (2014: 7-8) , in a similar vein, shows how digital technologies have not lessened paid work, but rather have maintained and even increased it they have done so, specifically, by creating new space and opportunities for commodification (see also Fuchs, 2014; Dyer-Witheford, 2015) . Take the example of digital devices such as mobile phones. New jobs have been created not just through their production, distribution, and sale, but also via their use these devices, in particular, have become valuable means for advertising, turning the private realm in which friends and family communicate with one another into new sources of profit-making (Huws, 2014: 14-16 (Lapavitsas, 2011; Thompson, 2013 The second point relates to the potential resistance of workers to digital technologies.
Brynjolfsson and McAfee is oddly tance although they refer to the power imbalances between the winners and losers of digital technologies, they omit to say how the losers (i.e. workers) will attempt to fight back against the winners (i.e.
capitalists). If, as argued above, digital technologies lead to an erosion in job quality, then their use is likely to elicit a negative response from workers. Rising inequality linked to the unequal ownership of digital technologies, too, can be expected to prompt some resistance 12 from workers. The point is not just that resistance is possible but also that it is necessary in ensuring that workers share in the gains from digital technologies. Without direct and collective resistance from workers, it can be argued that the fruits of digital technologies will flow disproportionately to capital. Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014: 199) advice to workers is not to organise and challenge capital, but instead to gain an education in order to be ready for the changes wrought by The collective dimension, including the role of class and class conflict, by contrast, is elided in their book. This blind-spot leads to a failure to see the need for collective action (including changes in ownership) to promote more equitable social and economic outcomes.
The third point focus on the promotion of more paid work, as if this is the main goal to be aimed for. Their justification is that work is beneficial (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014: 234) not just relative to the alternative of unemployment but also in an intrinsic sense work, they argue, -worth, community, engagement, (ibid.). Here, as argued above, Brynjolfsson and McAfee fail to see how digital technologies can undermine the quality of paid work.
Specifically, they ignore how the proliferation of digital technologies can be associated with the growth of insecure, episodic, intensive, and low paid work (Huws, 2014; Dyer-Witheford, 13 2015). In addition, the authors overlook the value of promoting a life beyond work and in their focus on creating more paid work they perpetuate the myth convenient to capital that wage labour is the main means to fulfilment in society. T (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014: 237) when it can be argued that the former is actually better achieved in a work-less economy (that is, an economy where the volume and duration of work is minimised as far as possible).
De-fetishising digital technologies
At a political level, Brynjolfsson and McAfee identify the potential for digital technologies to lessen drudgery and to extend human freedom in this sense they identify correctly an important goal for the use of digital technologies. As mentioned above, however, they fail to see how digital technologies can achieve the opposite outcomes (i.e. more drudgery and less freedom) where they are used by capital to increase profitability indeed they end up endorsing the pursuit of more paid work, ignoring the benefit of alternative goals including that of achieving less work. Their book, in short, can be argued to subvert the ideal of a better future for work and workers.
The crucial problem is that Brynjolfsson and McAfee fetishise digital technologies. They see these technologies in isolation from issues of ownership and power. They fail to see how such technologies are used under capitalism to promote the interests of capital and how progress in their use for emancipatory ends requires challenging the unequal power at the heart of capitalism. There are two points to make here. One concerns the importance of the social, economic, and political conditions of production for the development, use, and reproduction of digital technologies. The point is that digital technologies are not to be seen in purely technical and economic terms; rather they are to be viewed as politically and socially defined. Capitalism gives to digital technologies a particular form. It also helps to shape their boundaries and influence their outcomes, both in the sphere of production and distribution. In essence, digital technologies reflect and reinforce the class antagonisms of capitalist production. Firstly, within capitalism, support can be given to stronger state-enforced regulations that protect and promote the rights of workers in the digital economy. This could include, for example, new legal protections for workers employed in the so-15 (Friedman, 2014) . Secondly, moving beyond capitalism, the case can be made for forms of collective and shared ownership of production. Radically, the move to a system of workerowned firms can be seen as the only way for society to realise the full benefits of digital technologies. The obstacles, economic and political, to the realisation of worker ownership remain formidable, but they should not deter our commitment to overcome them. (Fuchs, 2014; Huws, 2014; Dyer-Witheford, 2015) . Other modern contributions such as that of Mason (2015) , again drawing on Marxian political economy, also promote critical thinking T common with these contributions, supports the application of Marxian political economy in the study of digital technologies.
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Two reasons can be given here for supporting Marxian political economy. The first is that it offers a way to explain how digital technologies are used and operated by capital to further the exploitation of workers it fixes attention, in this sense, on the political nature and implications of digital technologies. Secondly, from an ideological perspective, it galvanises critical debate on the need to develop and harness digital technologies in ways that transcend capitalism. In particular, it demands consideration of alternatives to the capitalist ownership of production, including, for example, forms of worker ownership. In short, it helps to promote a radical vision of the future in which digital technologies become means to human fulfilment, rather than tools for increasing profit. In this respect, it seeks to go beyond, and indeed subvert, the ideology of the Second Machine Age.
